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This paper examines the relationship between aggregate disclosure and investor expectations 
about the future economy (i.e. sentiment).  I specifically explore the relationship between the 
aggregate tone of firm-level annual and quarterly reports and common investor sentiment 
measures.  Controlling for a number of macroeconomic factors, I find that more negative aggregate 
tone is associated with less positive sentiment in future months.  Consistent with the Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) model of investor sentiment, I find that this result is stronger when 
the disclosure is more salient (i.e. lower tone dispersion) and is more statistically informative (i.e. 
higher filing intensity).  I also find preliminary evidence suggesting that aggregate tone relates to 
both short-term and long-term expectations and that it associates more to the non-fundamental 
expectations of investors.  Overall, the findings suggest accounting information may play a role in 








Expectations play an important role in shaping economic decisions and policies 
(Santomero, 2003).1  Consequently, macroeconomists have long been interested in how 
expectations are formed and their effect on the economy (Gutmann, 1997; Evans and Honkapohja, 
2001).    There is a large literature exploring the wide range of effects expectations about the future 
economy, or sentiment, have at both the firm-level and the macro-level (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 
2006; Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; Bram and Ludvigson, 1998).  As a result, how these expectations 
are formed has become an important topic to a wide range of economic agents, including market 
professionals who spend significant resources tracking these indices in pursuit of profitable trading 
strategies (Shleifer and Summers, 1990), as well as policymakers and regulators who often discuss 
market sentiment and its importance to the overall economy (e.g., Keynes, 1936; Greenspan, 1996; 
Shiller, 2000).   
However, despite the importance of sentiment and the vast literature examining its effects 
on the economy, less is empirically known about how those expectations are formed (e.g., Doms 
and Morin, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2011).  This paper attempts to address this question in the 
literature by examining how accounting information relates to sentiment.  I specifically argue that 
corporate disclosures at an aggregate level could influence sentiment for two primary reasons. 
                                                            
1 Expectations are defined as beliefs about the future.  I choose the term expectations to maintain consistency with the 
macroeconomic literature which generally discusses beliefs in the context of expectations about the future (Santomero, 




First, prior literature suggests corporate disclosures are an important source of information 
for investors that are used in the formation of their beliefs (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 
2001).  Furthermore, corporations are a significant component of the macroeconomy, comprising 
a large portion of the suppliers, employers, and private sector investors within the economy 
(Gabaix, 2011; Shivakumar and Urcan, 2014).  Consequently, aggregate corporate activities such 
as output and profits have been found to significantly affect the macroeconomy, including gross 
domestic product, interest rates, and inflation (e.g., Brown and Ball, 1967; Higson, Holly, and 
Kattuman, 2002; Bernstein and Arnott, 2003; Shivakumar, 2007).  Thus, it is possible that 
corporate disclosures at an aggregate level could affect investor expectations about the overall 
economy.   
On the other hand, there have been concerns over the information content of corporate 
disclosures.  Specifically, annual and quarterly filings have come under scrutiny for containing 
boilerplate and stale information (SEC, 2003; Bloomfield, 2008), with evidence that there is 
limited reaction from the market to their filings (Li and Ramesh, 2009).  Furthermore, there are 
numerous widely followed macroeconomic indicators (e.g., GDP, inflation, unemployment, etc.) 
that could either overshadow the information in corporate disclosures or subsume the information 
therein.  Thus, it is an empirical question as to whether corporate disclosures at an aggregate level 
relate to investor expectations about the future economy.   
To explore the relationship between aggregate corporate disclosure and sentiment, I 
examine how the average tone of firm-level annual and quarterly reports relate to three common 
measures of sentiment: the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment, the Conference 




I focus on the tonal aspect of disclosure for several reasons.  There is an established 
literature showing that language influences the perception and processing of information (e.g., 
Katz, 2001; Morris et al., 2005).  Consistent with this idea, information theory models such as 
Sims (2003) suggest the tone of economic reporting can affect expectations above and beyond the 
actual economic information content.  This is in part due to the fact that framing of performance 
is important in shaping individual’s perceptions of actual performance, with relative performance 
being more important than absolute performance at times (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1981).  
Thus, firms could influence investor expectations by using the tone in their filings to convey 
performance with respect to their own subjective benchmarks in a positive or negative sentiment 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005).  I use two measures of firm-level tone based on the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) textual dictionaries and aggregate to a monthly basis by taking 
the value-weighted average of firms filing each month. 
 To proxy for sentiment, I use three measures commonly used in the literature as there is no 
one consensus measure of sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).  While the University of 
Michigan and Conference Board indices are based on surveys of consumers who may or may not 
be investors, they represent direct measures of expectations about the future economy.  In addition, 
there is evidence suggesting these indices are better proxies for investor sentiment than commonly 
used market-based measures (Fisher and Statman, 2002; Qiu and Welch, 2004).  However, due to 
the possibility of noise in the measures from surveying consumers who may not necessarily be 
investors, I also use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) market-based sentiment index to try to better 
capture the sentiment of investors specifically. 
Estimating a lead-lag regression model using 227 monthly observations from 1994 to 2012, 




sentiment in future months.2  While controlling for a number of macroeconomic factors, the results 
remain economically significant, with a one standard deviation increase in past aggregate tone 
associated with anywhere from a 0.2 to 0.5 standard deviation decrease in sentiment.  Overall, the 
results suggest that aggregate tone contains information incremental to widely followed 
macroeconomic indicators. 
To reinforce my finding that aggregate tone could influence investor sentiment, I examine 
settings where prior theory suggests aggregate tone should influence expectations the most. 
Specifically, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) create a model of investor sentiment that argues 
that investors update their expectations based on two characteristics of information: strength and 
weight.  Strength is defined as the salience of information, whereas weight is the statistical 
informativeness of the information (e.g., sample size).  Based on their model, I expect that 
aggregate tone should have a stronger relationship with sentiment when the disclosures are more 
salient and statistically informative.   
Using within-month filing tone dispersion as a proxy for the salience of aggregate tone, I 
find that aggregate tone has a larger impact on future sentiment when tone dispersion is lower.  
This is consistent with aggregate tone being a stronger signal if there is less variation or 
disagreement in tone across firms in a given month.  Also consistent with the Barberis et al. (1998) 
model, I find that the association between aggregate tone and sentiment is larger when statistical 
informativeness is higher, with filing intensity utilized as a proxy for a larger, more representative 
sample of the population.   
                                                            
2 Analyses using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure of sentiment have between 201 and 203 monthly observations 




Overall, the results are consistent with aggregate tone having an impact on expectations 
about the future economy.  However, in the absence of an exogenous source of identification, 
endogeneity concerns remain and the results are subject to this caveat.   
Finally, to provide initial evidence on what type of expectations aggregate tone is related 
to, I examine the relationship between aggregate tone and different components of the University 
of Michigan and Conference Board indices. 
While the University of Michigan and Conference Board indices are measures of 
expectations of the future economy, they ask questions about both current and future economic 
conditions.  Subsequently, they each decompose their measures into current and expected (i.e. 
future) indices.  Despite concerns of annual and quarterly reports containing only backward-
looking, stale information, I find initial evidence that aggregate tone is related not only to short-
term expectations of economic conditions, but also long-term expectations potentially one or more 
years into the future.  These results could also be consistent with an adaptive expectations 
framework in which past information impacts future expectations (Gutmann, 1997).   
Up until this point, I have remained agnostic on whether sentiment represents rational or 
irrational expectations about the future economy.  The current literature suggests there are both 
rational and irrational elements.  While the three measures of sentiment used in this paper are 
commonly used as proxies for behavioral concepts (e.g., optimism or pessimism above and beyond 
the fundamentals), papers also suggest they have predictive power over future fundamentals such 
as consumer spending and growth (e.g., Bram and Ludvigson, 1998; Ludvigson, 2004).3  Other 
papers correspondingly find that some of their variation can be explained by fundamental factors 
                                                            
3 When surveying the recent literature in accounting on sentiment, four papers use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
measure and two use the University of Michigan index as measures of sentiment defined in various different ways but 




such as aggregate dividend yields and GDP (Sibley, Xing, and Zhang, 2013; Lemmon and 
Portniaguina, 2006).   
To provide further evidence on whether aggregate tone relates to fundamental or non-
fundamental expectations, I examine how my aggregate tone measures relate to the fundamental 
and non-fundamental components of my measures of sentiment.  Considering the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) measure is already orthogonalized to several macroeconomic factors by 
construction, I follow the methodology in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and only decompose 
the Michigan and Conference Board indices into a fundamental and non-fundamental component.  
Taking the main results with the Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure and initial results from these 
tests together suggest that aggregate tone relates to the non-fundamental component of 
expectations about the future economy. 
These results are particularly interesting as the prior literature provides evidence that firm-
level tone reflects information about future firm fundamentals (e.g., Li, 2010a; Davis, Piger, and 
Sedor, 2012).  The results presented in this paper could be attributable to information about 
fundamentals in tone not being perfectly impounded into expectations due to the difficulties of 
instant calibration and incorporation of information in a market of continuous information flows 
(Lee and So, 2015).  On the other hand, aggregate tone could be unintentionally influenced by 
managerial miscalibration or behavioral biases (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Ben-
David, Graham, and Harvey, 2013; Statman and Sepe, 1989; Shefrin, 2001) or intentional 
influence on the part of the manager due to strong incentives to skew disclosures (e.g., Kothari, 
Li, and Short, 2009).  While this test provides initial evidence of aggregate tone relating to the 
non-fundamental component of expectations about the future economy, how and why this is the 




This paper makes contributions to several different streams of literature.  First, the findings 
relate to the broad macroeconomic literature exploring the formation of expectations.  A growing 
number of empirical studies have focused on how inflation expectations are formed, but 
expectations of the overall economy have been less explored.  Recent papers suggest the news 
media or fundamentals influence future sentiment (e.g., Doms and Morin, 2004; Lemmon and 
Portniaguina, 2006).  This paper contributes to this growing literature by examining how aggregate 
disclosure tone can relate to expectations about the future economy, drawing attention to a 
potentially important role of accounting information at the aggregate level.   
Related to the macroeconomic expectations literature is a vast literature in behavioral 
finance examining the effects of investor beliefs that are seemingly unjustified by fundamentals.  
I extend the recent stream of literature examining what drives these beliefs (e.g., Sibley et al., 
2013; Doms and Morin, 2004) and provide evidence suggesting that corporate disclosures are a 
useful leading indicator of commonly used proxies of behavioral sentiment. In addition, by 
providing evidence that aggregate tone can lead all three measures up to three months in advance, 
the findings could be of interest to various parties, including market participants.  In the recent 
past, Thomson Reuters paid $1 million per year for exclusive access to the University of Michigan 
index and sold its early release to different classes of traders, with the most elite class obtaining 
the data two seconds before its release to the following class.4   
This paper also adds to a nascent, but developing literature examining accounting at the 
aggregate level.  Many current studies study the information content of aggregate earnings about 
the macroeconomy (e.g., Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner, 2006; Shivakumar, 2007).  More 
recently, Bochkay and Dimitrov (2015) examine the effect of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 





measure on aggregate tone.  I contribute to the literature by examining this less explored dimension 
of corporate disclosure, specifically aggregate tone, and whether evidence suggests it could 
influence expectations about the future economy, directly addressing the call in Anilowski, Feng, 
and Skinner (2007) for more research in this area.   
 Finally, this paper contributes to the extant disclosure literature.  While this area of research 
has primarily been focused at the firm-level and whether corporate disclosure policies and 
decisions have capital market consequences (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010), this 
paper examines disclosure at an aggregate level and relates it to expectations about the overall 
economy.  It also adds to the growing firm-level literature on sentiment and disclosure (e.g., 
Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008; Brown et al., 2012; Seybert and Yang, 2012; Cooper, 
Plumlee, and He, 2015).  While these papers focus on the reactive decisions managers make in 
response to investor sentiment, this paper examines whether aggregate disclosure could influence 
investor sentiment.   
 The paper proceeds as follows.  The next chapter discusses the related literature and 
hypothesis development.  Chapter 3 describes the data and variable descriptions.  Chapter 4 
discusses the research design and empirical results and Chapter 5 discusses results from additional 








Related literature and hypothesis development 
 
2.1. Expectations about the macroeconomy 
The critical role expectations play in the macroeconomy have been recognized as early as 
Keynes (1936).  While the majority of current macro models are grounded in a rational 
expectations framework, early critics commented on the lack of description as to how economic 
agents derive knowledge used to formulate expectations (Friedman, 1979).  In addition, more 
recent criticisms have concerned the inability of these models to produce features of 
macroeconomic data such as the high persistence of inflation (Carroll, 2003).   
Consequently, developments in the theoretical literature have begun to explore the 
implications of alternative assumptions about expectations formation, including models of 
learning (e.g., Sargent, 1993; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001), as well as sticky expectations and 
rational inattention (e.g., Carroll, 2003; Sims, 2003).  Despite the vast theoretical base for the 
literature, empirical evidence of how economic agents form their expectations is more limited 
(Carroll, 2003; Doms and Morin, 2004; Malmendier and Nagel, forthcoming).   
The present literature has largely focused on the formation of inflation expectations.  
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) use models of sticky information to examine the dispersion of 
inflation expectations over time, while Carroll (2003) further investigates the sticky-information 
model by studying the transmission of macroeconomic information from professional forecasters 




expectations in an adaptive learning model and Malmendier and Nagel (forthcoming) build on 
existing adaptive learning models by allowing personal experiences to play a role in shaping 
expectations about future inflation.  Despite the lack of convergence on which model best predicts 
inflation expectations (Mankiw et al., 2003; Blanchflower and Kelly, 2008), this line of research 
provides evidence of systematic deviations from full-information rational expectations.   
The area of research surrounding expectations of the overall economy remains less 
explored.  Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) suggest that the University of Michigan and 
Conference Board Consumer Confidence indices are led by a variety of macroeconomic indicators, 
such as GDP, inflation, and unemployment.  In a related study to this paper, Doms and Morin 
(2004) find evidence that independent of the economic content in the articles, the volume and tone 
of media coverage play a role in how the media influences consumer sentiment.  They also find 
that due to periods of reporting inconsistent with actual economic events, consumer sentiment can 
actually deviate from economic fundamentals.   
 
2.2. Behavioral sentiment 
One of the central concepts in behavioral finance is the notion of investor beliefs that 
cannot be easily traced back to fundamentals.  While the indication that stock prices seem to 
respond to price pressures unrelated to fundamentals dates back to Roll (1984) and Black (1986), 
there is a vast recent literature examining the potential effects of this behavioral sentiment on asset 
pricing and economic decisions.5   
                                                            
5 There are many different definitions of behavioral sentiment in the literature, including optimistic and pessimistic 
beliefs about stocks in general that deviate from current fundamental information (DeLong et al., 1990; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006; Lee and So, 2015), an overall social mood arising from a mix of rational and irrational biases affecting 
future expectations (Shiller, 2000), and beliefs conforming to psychological evidence rather than the normative 




At a firm level, there is evidence that behavioral sentiment affects a variety of firm policies 
and decisions, including stock returns (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006), investment decisions (e.g., 
Polk and Sapienza, 2009), as well as debt and equity issuances (e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 
1991; Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994). Interestingly, other commonly used measures of 
behavioral sentiment have been found to contain information about future macroeconomic 
fundamentals as well.  Acemoglu and Scott (1994) and Bram and Ludvigson (1998) both find that 
the University of Michigan and Conference Board indices predict future movements in consumer 
spending, with the Conference Board index in particular providing significant explanatory power 
for several different spending categories (e.g., total personal consumption expenditures, services, 
durables, etc.).6  In addition, Ludvigson (2004) finds evidence that the consumer sentiment 
measures contain some information about the future path of aggregate consumer expenditure 
growth.   
While there is a large literature examining the effects of behavioral sentiment at both the 
firm and macro levels, less is known about what influences these beliefs.  Sibley et al. (2013) focus 
on the Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure and find that the variation in the index is largely 
explained by Treasury bill rates, aggregate value-weighted dividend yields, and the percentage of 
stock with zero returns.  Arif and Lee (2014) examine both the University of Michigan index and 
the Baker and Wurgler (2006) index and find that aggregate investment moves alongside both 
measures.  In addition, as aforementioned in the previous section, both Doms and Morin (2004) 
and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) explore how the news media and macroeconomic indicators 
can influence the consumer sentiment indices.   
 
                                                            
6 Bram and Ludvigson (1998) find that the University of Michigan index also provides explanatory power, but to a 




2.3. Accounting and the macroeconomy 
A growing literature in accounting investigates the role of accounting in the 
macroeconomy.  The majority of papers thus far have specifically examined aggregate earnings 
and their relationship with macro variables.  Kothari et al. (2006) and Cready and Gurun (2010) 
specifically look at aggregate earnings surprises and market returns.  Both papers find evidence of 
a negative relationship between aggregate earnings and current market returns, suggesting that 
aggregate earnings conveys discount rate news.  Ball, Sadka, and Sadka (2009) meanwhile find 
evidence that aggregate earnings risks and return risks are related.    
On the other hand, while Anilowski et al. (2007) find that aggregate guidance captures 
aggregate quarterly earnings news, they find mixed evidence on whether aggregate earnings 
guidance is informative of market returns, finding some evidence that largely downward guidance 
is associated with market returns at the end of the calendar quarter.   
Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2009) examine the relationship between aggregate accruals, 
cash flows, and market returns.  In contrast to firm-level findings, they find that aggregate accruals 
(cash flows) is a strong positive (negative) predictor of aggregate returns, yet innovations in 
accruals (cash flows) are negatively (positively) correlated with concurrent returns, suggesting 
these innovations contain information about changes in discount rates.  More recently, Patatoukas 
(2014) finds evidence that aggregate earnings changes are correlated with new information about 
both discount rates as well as expected future cash flows.   
Connected to this literature, papers have begun to examine whether aggregate earnings 
contain information about future macroeconomic fundamentals.  Shivakumar (2007) finds 
evidence that aggregate earnings changes lead future inflation, but not industrial production 




Urcan (2014) investigate this further and find evidence consistent with aggregate earnings news 
affecting business investments rather than containing information about future consumption 
shocks.  Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014a) on the other hand find that the change in profitability 
of the 100 largest firms have predictive content for future real GDP growth.  They also find that 
although macroeconomic forecasters incorporate return data into their forecasts of real GDP 
growth, their projections could be improved by incorporating accounting profitability measures.   
While Gallo, Hann, and Li (2016) find mixed evidence on aggregate earnings growth as 
a leading indicator for real GDP growth, they find that it does lead both inflation and 
unemployment for up to six months.  They then explore how aggregate earnings changes relate to 
the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance, showing that aggregate earnings news is 
significantly associated with future changes in the federal funds target rate.  Crawley (2015) 
examines conditional conservatism at the aggregate level and also finds results suggesting that 
accounting can shape monetary policy decisions by altering the measurement attributes of key 
macroeconomic indicators.  Specifically, he finds that aggregate corporate profits and GDP 
compiled by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis are more sensitive to negative aggregate news 
than positive aggregate news.   
As evidenced by the work in the area thus far, the literature has provided a growing 
amount of evidence suggesting that aggregate earnings contain information about the 
macroeconomy.  However, we know less about how other dimensions of disclosure relate to the 
overall economy.  In a related paper, Bochkay and Dimitrov (2015) study how market sentiment 
affects aggregate managerial optimism.  Specifically, the authors examine the relationship between 
the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index and the aggregate tone of annual and quarterly 




managerial tone in the MD&A and that this increased optimism leads to lower earnings and returns 
in the future, suggesting that market sentiment leads to biased management disclosures which are 
in turn less useful to investors.   
 
2.4. Hypothesis development 
The primary research question in this paper is whether aggregate disclosure relates to 
investor expectations about the future economy.  On one hand, there are numerous important 
macroeconomic indicators that are widely covered by the media (e.g., GDP, unemployment, 
inflation, etc.).  These indicators could have an important influence on investor expectations and 
eclipse any information contained in corporate annual and quarterly reports, which have received 
criticisms for being stale and backward looking (SEC, 2003).7  In addition, due to the fact that tone 
is soft information requiring more information processing, investors could underweight this signal 
despite its potential information content (e.g., Gleason and Lee, 2003; Della Vigna and Pollet, 
2007; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2013).   
However, corporate disclosures are a significant and important source of information to 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001) which they incorporate into their beliefs (Verrecchia, 2001).  
In addition, corporations comprise a large part of the overall economy and can affect a large 
number of macro factors through their investments, production, and employment.  As their filings 
are released on a near-daily basis, their disclosures could convey important timely information 
about the macroeconomy (Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer, 2013) or potentially the systematic 
component of corporate economic news when aggregated (Ball et al., 2009).  Thus, corporate 
                                                            
7 Even if firms did have important private macroeconomic information, there could be costs to revealing this 




disclosures overall could be an important factor in investor expectations of the future economy.  
Accordingly, my first hypothesis is: 
H1: Increases in aggregate tone (measured as a percentage of net negative words) are related to 
future decreases in investor sentiment.   
 
Although 10-K and 10-Q SEC filings contain a great amount of textual and numerical 
information, I choose to focus on the tonal facet of the disclosures due to the importance of 
contextual information for belief formation.8  Consistent with literature showing language 
influences the perception and processing of information, Sims (2003) presents an information 
theory model suggesting that expectations can be influenced more by the tone of economic 
reporting than the underlying economic information.  The reasoning behind this proposition is 
there is a significant body of literature suggesting the way one performs relative to others can be 
more important than performance in absolute terms (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1981; Mowen 
and Mowen, 1986; Azar, 2008).  Managers could therefore alter investor perceptions of the 
absolute content of their filings by choosing subjective reference points to convey their 
performance in a certain light, which is in turn captured in their filing tone (Graham et al., 2005).  
Thus, I focus on the tonal aspect of disclosures as it contains important contextual information that 
is shown to be important to the formation of investor expectations, perhaps more so than 
quantitative data.   
To provide further support that aggregate tone could influence investor expectations about 
the economy, I use guidance from the Barberis et al. (1998) model of investor sentiment to examine 
                                                            
8 In addition, I choose not to focus on other textual aspects of filings such as amount or transparency and/or readability 
as the predictions are unclear.  Consider an increase in the number of filings; unlike voluntary disclosure, the variation 
in the volume of these mandatory filings is more likely due to industry reporting cycles than the amount of new 
information.  In addition, if all firms say something different in their filings, it is not clear investors would change 
their expectations even if the volume of filings is high.  In terms of transparency and readability, once again it is 




whether aggregate tone has a stronger relationship with investor sentiment in certain expected 
settings.  Barberis et al. (1998) develop a model of investor expectations outlining how investors 
process information to form their expectations.  The model assumes that investors update their 
expectations based on two informational characteristics: strength and weight.  The strength of the 
information is defined as how salient the information is, while the weight of the information is 
how statistically informative it is (e.g., sample size).  Based on their model, my second and third 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H2: Increases in aggregate tone (measured as a percentage of net negative words) are related to 
larger future decreases in investor sentiment when aggregate tone is more salient (measured as 
within-month filing tone dispersion).   
 
H3: Increases in aggregate tone (measured as a percentage of net negative words) are related to 
larger future decreases in investor sentiment when aggregate tone has more weight (measured as 
filing intensity).   
 
 Specifically, if aggregate tone influences sentiment, I would expect the relationship 
between aggregate tone and future sentiment to be stronger when the dispersion of firm-level filing 
tone is smaller as there is less disagreement amongst firms and therefore a stronger signal.  In other 
words, if firms are disclosing a similar message, investors will be more likely to incorporate that 
message into their expectations.  Also, if aggregate tone represents a bigger sample of firms for a 
particular month, that should lead to a stronger relationship between aggregate tone and future 








Data and variable descriptions 
 
3.1. Sample and data 
My initial sample is based on firms with SEC filing data in the EDGAR database.  All 
firms with 10-K and 10-Q filings from EDGAR with the necessary requirements to calculate my 
firm-level measures of tone were retained.  This restricts my sample from years 1994 to 2012.  I 
also require firms to have Compustat data on quarterly income before extraordinary items to 
calculate firm-level measures of earnings surprise, as well as monthly market capitalization data 
from CRSP to obtain weights for my value-weighted tone measures.   
My proxies for investor sentiment were obtained from the University of Michigan Survey 
of Consumers website, the Conference Board, and Jeffrey Wurgler’s website.  Macroeconomic 
variables were collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED), the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and CRSP. 9   
 
3.2. Variable descriptions 
3.2.1. Aggregate disclosure 
The specific characteristic of disclosure that I examine is the linguistic tone of 10-K and 
10-Q SEC filings.10  I choose to focus on the 10-K and 10-Q filings for several reasons.  First, 
                                                            
9 Consumption-wealth ratios were obtained from Sydney Ludvigson’s website.   
10 The tone of firm-level filings could represent managerial or firm sentiment or optimism (e.g. Feldman et al., 2010; 




annual and quarterly reports are a rich information source with in-depth descriptions on a wide 
array of company topics, including overall firm outlook, company operations, and performance.  
Thus, it is possible they may contain more information about the overall economy in addition to 
having more contextual information compared to other measures of disclosure.11  In addition, they 
are filed on a near daily basis and are publicly available to all investors, providing potentially 
timely information to a broad array of investors.  Consequently, they have been frequently cited 
as information sources for investors as well as analysts (Previts et al., 1994; Rogers and Grant, 
1997). Finally, these reports are mandated for all US public firms, theoretically providing a more 
representative sample that is less subject to potential biases of the disclosure decision choice (e.g., 
performance).   
I also choose to focus on the entire filing as opposed to just the Management, Discussion, 
and Analysis (MD&A) section.12  While the MD&A has been argued to be the most widely read 
section of the financial statement, containing the most forward-looking information, there are also 
critiques that it only contains boilerplate information (Pozen, 2008).13  In addition, contextual 
information about the firm and its performance is discussed in areas other than just the MD&A 
(e.g. notes discussing performance and changes in account balances in relation to industry 
economic conditions, the macroeconomic outlook, etc.).  Furthermore, it is also important to not 
solely stress forward-looking information in the formation of expectations as expectations relate 
not only to future information, but also take into account past and current information (Wyer and 
                                                            
managerial private information sets as managers have access to important data on firm operations and the state of 
labor and capital markets (e.g., Bochkay and Dimitrov, 2015).   
11 For example, 8-Ks could have information about CEO and/or director departures, delistings, etc. that do not provide 
as much context as the annual and quarterly filings, nor as much macroeconomic information.   
12 This is similar to prior papers in the literature such as Kothari et al. (2009); Lehavy, Li, and Merkley (2011), Li 
(2010b), and Li, Lundholm, and Minnis (2013).   
13 Forward-looking statements in the MD&A may also require the most managerial subjectivity, making it the most 




Albarracin, 2005).  Correspondingly, the adaptive expectations framework in macroeconomics 
model expectation formation as an extrapolation of past information.   
To calculate firm-level measures of filing tone, I use the Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
dictionaries which specify lists of positive and negative words tailored for financial documents 
and specifically SEC filings.  I use two measures of firm-level filing tone, both based on the 
number of net negative words, i.e. the relative number of negative to positive words.  My two 
measures of firm-level filing tone are:  
 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 =






(# 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 − # 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)
(# 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 + #𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)
 
(2) 
While prior literature suggests that negative words convey more information than positive 
words (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Hutton et al., 2003), more recent evidence suggests that both positive 
and negative words have incremental information content to one another (Henry and Leone, 
forthcoming).  Thus, my tone measures are based on the relative proportion of negative to positive 
words.  While the first measure takes into account the total length of the document (i.e. total 
number of words), the second measure only takes into account the number of tonal words, reducing 
the effect of numerous tonal-neutral words.  Finally, I equal-weight all words based on Henry and 
Leone (forthcoming).14 
   To calculate my aggregate measure of disclosure tone, I take the value-weighted average 
of firm-level filing tones for all firms filing in a month and multiply by 100 to obtain a percentage 
value.  I use a value-weighted measure as disclosures of larger firms may have a larger impact on 
                                                            
14 Henry and Leone (TAR, forthcoming) find that while idf weighting provides some improvement to the power of 
tone measures for certain randomly-selected samples, the results are not consistent and the improvement is minor 




investor expectations as they represent a more significant proportion of macroeconomic activity 
(Gabaix, 2011).   The value-weighting is based on monthly market capitalization data from CRSP 
and I weight each firm-level filing tone by the firm’s market capitalization proportion for that 
month.  Thus, variables TONE_TOTAL and TONE_TONAL represent the value-weighted average 
of the firm-level filing tones in a month.   
 
3.2.2. Sentiment 
Investor sentiment is a difficult construct to capture empirically and consequently the 
literature lacks a consensus measure (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).  I choose to use three commonly 
used measures in the literature that have advantages with respect to this specific study.   
My first two measures are the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment, 
ICS, and the Conference Board’s Index of Consumer Confidence, CBICS.  Both indices are based 
on US survey data, with the former conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research 
Center and the latter independently by the Conference Board.  Each group polls a large number of 
households on a monthly basis, asking questions concerning personal financial situations to overall 
business conditions.  The questions are aggregated into a monthly index that represents public 
confidence in the overall economy.15   
The use of survey-based expectations data has been an important part of macroeconomic 
analysis (Gennaioli et al., 2015) and one of the primary benefits of these surveys is they are direct 
measures of expectations about the economy.  Even though they survey consumers, which may or 
may not be investors, recent literature suggests these consumer sentiment measures are 
appropriate, and even better, measures of investor sentiment than market-based measures.   
                                                            




 Fisher and Statman (2002) provide evidence that the measures of consumer sentiment are 
positively correlated with a direct measure of investor sentiment compiled by the American 
Association of Individual Investors from 1987 to 2000.  Similarly, Qiu and Welch (2004) find a 
positive relationship between the consumer sentiment measures and a direct measure of investor 
sentiment compiled by UBS/Gallup.   
 Despite this evidence, there remains the concern that these measures do not capture 
investor sentiment.  Thus, I use the market-based Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index as an 
additional proxy for investor sentiment.  The Baker and Wurgler (2006) index is comprised of six 
proxies: 1) the value-weighted closed-end fund discount, 2) NYSE share turnover, 3) the number 
of IPOs, 4) the average first-day IPO returns, 5) the dividend premium, and 6) the ratio of gross 
equity issuance to total gross debt and equity issuance.  Each proxy is orthogonalized to 
macroeconomic measures and the index is based on the first principal component of each proxy 
and their one-year lags.16 
Although the Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure does not correlate well with direct 
measures of investor sentiment (Qiu and Welch, 2004) and direct measures of expectations are 
available (i.e., ICS and CBICS), this market-based index arguably captures investor expectations 
better. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
To mitigate correlated omitted variable concerns, I control for a number of fundamental 
and macroeconomic factors to better isolate the relationship between aggregate tone and investor 
sentiment.   
                                                            
16 Baker and Wurgler (2006) regress each of the six raw proxies on growth in industrial production index, growth in 




To control for firm fundamentals, I include the aggregate earnings surprise, which I 
calculate as the value-weighted average of firm-level standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) 
announced during a month.  Specifically I assume that earnings expectations are based on a 
seasonal random-walk model.  Following prior literature, I model expected earnings as: 
 𝐸[𝑒𝑡
𝑖] = 𝑒𝑡−4
𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 (3) 
where 𝛿𝑖 is the expected change in earnings from the same quarter’s earnings of the prior year, 
and is referred to as the earnings drift for firm i.  I estimate the drift using up to twenty quarters of 












where n is the number of intervals used to calculate drift and where one interval requires earnings 
information for a given quarter and the same quarter in the prior year.  I then standardize the 
unexpected earnings measure by dividing each firm’s surprise by the standard deviation of that 
firm’s earnings, as measured by the available subset of the preceding twenty announcements.  












𝑖) is estimated using up to the previous twenty announcements. 
I also control for a variety of macroeconomic variables, including the log consumption-to-
wealth ratio from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) (CAY); the natural log of personal consumption 
expenditures per capita (CONS); the inflation rate (CPI); the default rate, calculated as the 
difference between yields to maturity on Moody’s Baa- and Aaa-rated bonds (DEF); the natural 




income, measured as real disposable personal income per capita, deflated by the PCE deflator 
(LABOR); the unemployment rate (URATE); and the yield on three-month Treasury bills (YLD3).17 
Lastly, I also control for the number of annual and quarterly reports filed per month 
(FILINGCT) to account for differences in the number of filings across months.   
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample.  The mean (median) values of ICS, 
CBICS, and BW are 87.78 (90.60), 94.68 (98.40), and 0.15 (0.02), respectively, with significant 
variation in each measure over the sample period.  On average, 667 10-Qs and 10-Ks are filed each 
month.  However, there is a wide variation in the number of filings filed each month, with the 
median value being only 367 filings per month.  For the monthly aggregated filings, 0.92% of total 
words are net negative on average and 35.84% of total tonal words are net negative on average.  
Finally, the mean (median) aggregate earnings surprise during my sample period is approximately 
-$0.02 ($0.04).   
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the sample.  There is a significantly 
positive correlation between all three investor sentiment proxies, ranging in magnitude from 0.22 
to 0.93, with the strongest correlation being between the two consumer sentiment indices.  The 
significant correlation between all three measures provides some additional confidence that the 
measures are capturing similar constructs.  Of primary interest in this paper is the correlation 
between the sentiment and aggregate tone measures.  The correlation between all three sentiment 
measures and both aggregate disclosure tone measures are significantly negative at the 1% level, 
with magnitudes ranging from -0.17 to -0.26.  Although the univariate correlation provides support 
                                                            
17 Controls CAY, CONS, GDP, and LABOR are multiplied by 100 so that all coefficients on macroeconomic control 




for the predicted relationship between sentiment and aggregate disclosure tone, in the following 
section I focus on the multivariate relationship between aggregate tone and sentiment to control 
for fundamental and macroeconomic factors that could be driving the observed univariate 








Research design and empirical results 
 
4.1.Aggregate tone and sentiment 
4.1.1. Main research design 
To examine whether there is a relationship between aggregate disclosure tone and 
sentiment, I first estimate the following pooled time-series regression: 
 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡+𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 
+𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 




where 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡+𝑗 is either ICS, CBICS, or BW during month t+j (j = 0, 1 or 2);  
𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑡−1 is either TONE_TOTAL or TONE_TONAL during month t-1; and all other variables 
are as defined in the previous section, as well as Appendix A, during month t-1.  All observations 
are at a monthly level.   
Due to the current lack of economic theory providing a consensus model specification to 
explain the dynamics of investor sentiment, I use an OLS regression model correcting for standard 
errors (Cochrane, 2012).18  With respect to the potential for autocorrelation in the error terms, I 
use Newey-West standard errors with four lags as is common practice in time-series analysis.  I 
chose four lags based on two criteria: 1) n1/4, where n is the number of time-series observations 
                                                            




(Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2014b) and 2) minimization of the Akaike Information Criterion.  
Both tests yield four lags, which is what I use in all my analyses.19 
I also use lead-lag regressions to not only help mitigate reverse causality issues, but due to 
the fact that soft information such as tone could take more time to process and perpetuate to all 
investors.20  The use of lagged independent variables also allows for the filing information and 
macroeconomic data to be available prior to the formation of the next month’s expectations about 
the overall economy.21   
 
4.1.2. Main results 
The multivariate regression results examining the relationship between aggregate tone and 
sentiment are presented in Table 3, Panels A, B, and C for the ICS, CBICS, and BW samples, 
respectively.  Consistent with initial predictions, I find that more negative tone in monthly filings 
precedes significantly more negative sentiment up to three months in the future.  Specifically I 
find that there is a significantly negative coefficient on both measures of aggregate tone relating 
to all three measures of sentiment for months t, t+1, and t+2.  The persistence of the relationship 
could be consistent with a sticky expectations or rational inattention framework, with soft 
information taking time to perpetuate the entire economy due to past information being an 
important source of information for generating future expectations and/or partial attention to the 
information (Carroll, 2003). 
                                                            
19 Upon re-running my analyses with various different lags (i.e. 8, 12, 24, 36, and 48), I find my results are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  
20 This could also be consistent with sticky expectations or rational inattention models (Carroll, 2003).   
21 For example, monthly data from the St. Louis FRED can represent different times within that month (i.e., beginning, 
middle, or end of the month).  Thus, by using the prior month’s data, it is more likely that this information has been 
released prior to the formation of the next month’s expectations.  Another example would be the University of 
Michigan survey, whose interviewing process for month t begins a couple days in month t-1 and runs until the end of 
month t.  By using disclosures filed in month t-1, the research design allows for filings to be issued before or a couple 




The results are also economically significant.  While controlling for numerous 
macroeconomic and fundamental factors, a one standard deviation increase in past TONE_TOTAL 
(TONE_TONAL) is associated with a 0.2 (0.2) standard deviation decrease in both the ICS and 
CBICS and a 0.4 (0.4) standard deviation decrease in the BW measure in the following month.   
In terms of controls, it is also interesting to note the earnings surprise variable does not 
load for the first leading month in the majority of the specifications.  This is somewhat consistent 
with Kothari et al. (2006) who find that returns are unrelated to past aggregate earnings or it could 
also be attributable to the information in aggregate earnings being subsumed by another numerical 
summary measure (e.g., GDP).  The macroeconomic controls operate similarly for ICS and CBICS, 
with larger default spreads being associated with lower sentiment in the future and greater levels 
of GDP being associated with higher sentiment in the future.  The Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
measure on the other hand is positively associated with prior treasury yields and consumption-to-
wealth ratios.   
 
4.2. Variations in the informational characteristics of aggregate tone 
While the initial results suggest aggregate tone could influence future investor sentiment, 
it is important to address the lack of identification and consequent presence of endogeneity issues.  
The first issue is the presence of a correlated omitted variable.  The concern is that there is a latent 
factor, such as a macroeconomic force, that is driving both aggregate disclosure tone and sentiment 
simultaneously, resulting in the observed negative relationship.  In addition, there are reverse 
causality concerns.  There is growing empirical evidence suggesting that investor sentiment has 
an effect on firm-level disclosure policies (e.g., Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008; Brown et al., 




different stakeholders, including managers, Bochkay and Dimitrov (2015) find evidence that a 
third of the time-series variation in average management tone is explained by investor sentiment.   
While I make certain research design choices to mitigate these issues (e.g., inclusion of 
numerous macroeconomic controls, lead-lag regressions), I perform additional tests in this section 
examining settings where theory suggests aggregate tone should have a stronger influence on 
investor sentiment.  Specifically, based on the Barberis et al. (1998) model of investor sentiment, 
I examine how the relationship between aggregate tone and sentiment varies depending on the 
strength and weight of aggregate tone.   
 
4.2.1. Strength 
To test whether aggregate tone has a stronger association with future sentiment when 
aggregate tone is stronger, I estimate the following regression with Newey-West standard errors: 
 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡+𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐿_𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐿_𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 
+𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 




SENTIMENT and all control variables are as defined earlier. AGG_DISL represents either 
TONE_TOTAL or TONE_TONAL.   
 To proxy for the strength, or salience, of the information in aggregate disclosure tone, I use 
tone dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of within-month firm-level tone measures.22  I 
then divide the aggregate tone measure into two variables conditional on monthly tone dispersion 
                                                            
22 To minimize issues with monthly standard deviations being driven by distribution tails, I take the natural log of 




following methodologies used in the macroeconomic literature for similar analyses (e.g., Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko, 2013; Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy, 2013).23   
Specifically, AGG_DISL_HIGHDISP equals AGG_DISL when the month’s standard 
deviation of within-month firm-level filing tone is in the top tercile of the monthly standard 
deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.24  AGG_DISL_LOWDISP equals AGG_DISL when the 
month’s standard deviation of within-month firm-level filing tone is in the bottom two terciles of 
the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  By dividing the aggregate 
tone measures in this manner, I can examine how aggregate tone relates to investor sentiment in 
states of high and low tone dispersion, as well as whether tone dispersion has a persistent effect 
on the relationship.   
The results are found in Table 4, Panels A, B, and C.  Consistent with aggregate disclosure 
having an effect on investor expectations when they are most likely to according to the Barberis et 
al. (1998) model, I find that the coefficients on my aggregate tone measures are larger when 
aggregate tone dispersion is lower for investor sentiment at time t.  This difference is statistically 
significant for both tone measures and all three measures of investor sentiment.  Interestingly, I 
also find that this difference persists into future months, suggesting that when firms’ disclosures 
are more similar, they continue to impact future sentiment more than when firms’ disclosures are 




                                                            
23 These papers specifically examine whether government spending multipliers are larger during times when resources 
are idle (e.g., recessions, periods of high unemployment, etc.).   





To test whether aggregate tone has a stronger association with future sentiment when 
aggregate tone has more weight, I estimate the following regression with Newey-West standard 
errors: 
 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡+𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐿_𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−1 
+𝛽2 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐿_𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 




SENTIMENT and all control variables are as defined earlier. AGG_DISL represents either 
TONE_TOTAL or TONE_TONAL.   
 To proxy for the weight, or statistical informativeness, of aggregate disclosure tone, I use 
filing intensity, or the number of filings in a month.  I perform the same analyses as in the tone 
dispersion tests only dividing the aggregate tone measure based upon filing count.  
AGG_DISL_HIGHFILING equals AGG_DISL when the filing count for the month is above the 
median monthly filing count for the sample, and zero otherwise.25  AGG_DISL_LOWFILING equals 
AGG_DISL when the filing count for the month is below the median monthly filing count for the 
sample, and zero otherwise.  For this analysis I omit sample years 1994 and 1995 as the annual 
and quarterly report filings available on EDGAR were dramatically lower in these years and 
represent outliers for the bifurcation variable.26   
The results are found in Table 5, Panels A, B, and C.  I find that the coefficients on my 
aggregate tone measures are larger when filing intensity is higher for investor sentiment at time t 
for five out of the six specifications.  This difference is statistically significant for both tone 
measures and the ICS and CBICS measures of investor sentiment.  The results are qualitatively 
                                                            
25 The median classification is based upon graphical cutoff points in the data.   




similar for TONE_TONAL and the BW measure.  This difference also persists in future months, 
although the coefficients lose statistical significance in certain cases.   
Overall, the results are consistent with the Barberis et al. (1998) model of investor 
sentiment.  Aggregate disclosure tone has a stronger relationship with investor sentiment when the 
signal is more salient (i.e. lower tone dispersion) and statistically informative (i.e. higher filing 
intensity).  These results, alongside the research design choices hopefully mitigate some of the 
endogeneity concerns surrounding the main analyses and provide initial evidence that aggregate 
disclosure tone could have an influence on investor sentiment.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge that I cannot completely address the endogeneity concerns in this paper due to the 








Additional tests and robustness analyses 
 
5.1. Additional tests 
5.1.1. Components of sentiment 
To provide some evidence on what type of expectations aggregate tone relates to, I examine 
the relationship between aggregate tone and different components of the University of Michigan 
and Conference Board indices.   
Current versus expected 
In this paper, I define sentiment as investor expectations about the future economy and 
provide evidence suggesting that aggregate tone could influence these expectations.  While the 
Michigan and Conference Board indices capture expectations of the future economy, both indices 
include questions pertinent to current, as well as future economic conditions.  For example, the 
University of Michigan survey contains questions asking about current financial conditions, 
business conditions in the next year, as well as business conditions in the next five years.  As such, 
both groups separate the questions into two categories, creating indices of current and expected 
sentiment.  In order to better understand what time horizon aggregate tone relates to, I replace the 
ICS and CBICS measures in equation (6) with their current and expected components and examine 
how aggregate tone relates to both the current and expected sentiment indices.  The results are 




Across both measures, the aggregate tone measure is significantly negatively correlated 
with both the current and expected components of both the ICS and CBICS.  Results on which 
component aggregate tone is related to more are mixed.  While the coefficient on the expected 
component of the ICS index is larger than the current component, the magnitudes are flipped for 
the CBICS index, with the coefficient on aggregate tone being larger for the current component 
than the expected component.  Regardless, the results provide initial evidence that aggregate tone 
relates to expectations about the future by not only containing information about short-term 
economic conditions that could have an influence on expectations further into the future (e.g., 
sticky expectations), but also potentially information pertaining to conditions one or more years 
into the future.   
Fundamental versus non-fundamental 
Throughout the paper, I remain agnostic on whether sentiment represents rational or 
irrational expectations about the future economy.  Regardless of whether the expectations are 
rational or not, it is important to better understand what influences them.  However, in this section 
I begin to explore whether aggregate tone relates to expectations related or unrelated to 
fundamentals.   
While the literature commonly uses the two consumer sentiment indices and the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) index as measures of optimism or pessimism above and beyond the fundamentals, 
there is also evidence that these measures contain information about future fundamentals.  For 
example, there is evidence that both consumer sentiment indices predict future household spending 
(Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; Bram and Ludvigson, 1998) and Curtin (2004) reports that the 
University of Michigan index anticipates changes in real GDP and unemployment.  Lemmon and 




of business cycles, while Sibley et al. (2013) provide evidence that even the Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) measure can be explained by fundamental factors such as aggregate dividend yields.   
To explore which type of expectations aggregate tone relates to, I examine the relationship 
between my aggregate tone measures and the fundamental and non-fundamental components of 
the consumer sentiment measures.  To do so, I follow the methodology in Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006) and decompose the indices into two components.  Specifically, I perform the 
following regression of the ICS and CBICS measures of sentiment on various macroeconomic 
variables:27   
 𝐼𝐶𝑆 (𝐶𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑆)𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑌𝐿𝐷3𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡 
+𝑏6𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅 + 𝑏7𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝑏8𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝑏9𝐶𝐴𝑌𝑡 + 𝑏10𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝑏11𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡−1 
+𝑏12𝑌𝐿𝐷3𝑡−1 + 𝑏13𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑏14𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑏15𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑏16𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 




where DIV is the dividend yield measured as the total cash ordinary dividend of the CRSP value-
weighted index for month t; and all other variables are as defined in Appendix A during either 
month t or t-1.  The predicted value represents the fundamental component of the indices, while 
the residual represents the non-fundamental component.  I then regress these predicted and residual 
values on the aggregate tone measures and the fundamental aggregate earnings surprise control, 
correcting for auto-correlation with Newey-West standard errors.   
Table 7 presents the results of these analyses.  The results of both indices are consistent 
with one another: there is a significantly negative relationship between the aggregate tone 
measures and the non-fundamental components of the indices and there is no significant 
relationship with the fundamental components.  Consistent with the results using the Baker and 
                                                            




Wurgler (2006) measure, the results suggest that aggregate tone relates to the non-fundamental 
component of expectations.   
 These results are quite interesting in light of the prior literature on tone at the firm-level.  
Li (2010a) finds that increases in optimism in the MD&A predict better future earnings and higher 
liquidity.  Davis et al. (2012) find consistent results that an increase in optimism in earnings press 
releases precede higher future ROA.  The literature also finds evidence that the market responds 
positively to increased levels of optimism in both earnings releases as well as 10-K filings (e.g., 
Henry, 2008; Davis et al., 2012; Feldman et al., 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011).   
Despite the results found in the prior literature, the initial results suggesting that aggregate 
tone relates to the non-fundamental portion of expectations about the future economy could be 
attributable to a couple different factors.  First, it could be the case that consistent with prior 
literature, there is fundamental information in aggregate tone, but that information is not perfectly 
impounded into expectations.  For example, there could be overreactions or underreactions to the 
information (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Bernard, 1992; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993).  It could also be the case that aggregate tone is unintentionally or intentionally 
influenced by managerial biases.  A growing literature shows that managers appear to be 
influenced by behavioral biases of their own and can also be considerably miscalibrated in their 
own expectations.  Malmendier and Tate (2005) find evidence of managerial overconfidence 
leading to investment inefficiencies, while Ben-David et al. (2013) find that managers’ 
expectations of the stock market are severely miscalibrated and this is at times correlated with 
miscalibration of firm prospects.  In addition, managers also have strong incentives to skew 
disclosures (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009).  While this paper does not delve into these channels 
specifically, this could be an interesting topic for future research.   
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5.1.2. Market return channel analysis 
The primary research question this paper explores is whether aggregate disclosure relates 
to investor expectations about the future economy.  One of the channels through which aggregate 
disclosure tone could affect investor expectations is through the market.  Edmans, Goncalves-
Pinto, and Xu (2014) note that information can influence decisions directly or indirectly through 
signals like prices.  To test this hypothesis, I perform a channel analysis by running my main 
empirical specification including the market return as an additional control.  If investors are 
influenced by aggregate tone through the market return, I would expect the inclusion of the market 
return to reduce the significance and/or magnitude of the coefficient on my aggregate tone 
measures.   
In untabulated results, although the coefficients on the aggregate disclosure tone measures 
decrease in magnitude when including the CRSP value-weighted market return, they do so only 
minimally and continue to retain their statistical significance.  Thus, the market may be a way 
aggregate disclosure relates to investor sentiment, but the current results do not provide strong 
support for that channel.   
5.2. Robustness analyses 
5.2.1. Different measures of tone and sentiment 
In my analyses I use two net measures of tone, taking into account the difference between 
negative and positive words in filings as prior literature suggests there is information in both types 
of words (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Henry and Leone, forthcoming).  To provide further evidence that 
both word types contain information about sentiment, I also use the percentage of negative words 




find that the main results are qualitatively similar: a higher percentage of negative words is 
associated with significantly lower sentiment in future months and a higher percentage of positive 
words is associated with significantly higher sentiment in future months.28   
I use three separate measures of sentiment for my main analyses as opposed to using a 
principal components based approach.  However, when using the first principal component of my 
three sentiment measures as a proxy for sentiment, I find that my results are quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar.29   
 
5.2.2. Stationarity and serial correlation 
Before my initial analyses, I performed the Dickey-Fuller test to assess the stationarity in 
my variables and found most could be rejected.  However, when using a change specification for 
my control variables, the main results are similar.  When graphically observing the data, there does 
not appear to be a strong trend in the sentiment or tone measures over the sample period.   However, 
to mitigate the presence of any trends or seasonality in the data that may affect both sentiment and 
tone due to a third unobserved factor, I perform several robustness tests.  First, I include a yearly 
time trend to account for a stable trend in certain variables.  Second, I control for an overall time 
trend to capture any linear trends over the sample period.  Third, I control for both an overall time 
trend and its squared value to capture a nonlinear, quadratic trend.  Fourth, I include an NBER 
recession indicator to control for cyclicality over time.  Fifth, I include month fixed effects to 
                                                            
28 In addition, when running the main analyses with both positive and negative words separately, I find that each 
measure has incremental significance to the other.   
29 Untabulated principal component analysis of the correlation matrix yields the first factor with an eigenvalue greater 
than one that explains approximately 70% of the variation in the variables.  The correlation matrix was utilized as the 




account for any industry reporting cycles or other unobservables that change across months (e.g., 
seasonality).30  For all tests, the main results are similar.   
While I use Newey West standard errors to allay concerns of potential serial correlation in 
the error terms due to the correlation in sentiment with itself over time, another method of handling 
serially correlated errors is a lagged specification, particularly when current values are thought to 
be a function of prior values (Shumway and Stoffer, 2006).  When including lagged values of 
sentiment in months t-1 to t-3, I find the main results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  
Additionally, I run analyses using three-month rolling windows for my independent variables to 
account for potential serial correlation in my regressors and again find my results are similar.   
 
5.2.3. Controls 
In my main specification, I control for past realizations of macroeconomic variables as 
prior data could have a strong influence on future investor sentiment and this also helps to ensure 
data is released prior to investors forming their expectations.  However, as current realizations 
could obviously have a strong impact as well, I control for current values of my macroeconomic 
controls and find the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  I also find results are 
similar when controlling for industrial production data from the St. Louis FRED rather than GDP 
or when I use different measures of aggregate earnings surprise, such as the sum of all firms’ 
seasonally difference quarterly earnings scaled by aggregate lagged market value of equity (e.g., 
Gallo et al. 2016) or one taking the difference between earnings and analyst consensus forecasts 
(e.g., Shivakumar and Urcan, 2014).   
                                                            
30 In terms of industry reporting cycles, this paper is agnostic on which firms report in each month. The main interest 




Finally, I find that even when I include contemporaneous aggregate tone as an additional 
regressor, the main results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  These results suggest that 










Expectations of the future economy play an important role in influencing economic 
decisions and policies.  This paper seeks to add to our understanding of how those expectations 
are formed by finding evidence that accounting information at an aggregate level relates to future 
investor sentiment.   
Specifically, I find that more negative aggregate tone is associated with less positive 
sentiment in the following three months, controlling for numerous macroeconomic factors.  In 
addition, consistent with the Barberis et al. (1998) model of investor sentiment, I find that this 
relationship is stronger when the disclosure is more salient and statistically informative.  I also 
provide preliminary evidence on what type of expectations aggregate tone relates to, finding 
evidence suggestive that it not only relates to short-term future expectations, but also long-term 
expectations.  I also find initial evidence suggesting that aggregate tone relates more to the non-
fundamental component of expectations about the future economy.   
Despite sentiment being widely followed by academics, industry practitioners, as well as 
policymakers, there is less empirical knowledge about what influences these expectations.  This 
paper adds to a growing empirical macroeconomic literature exploring how expectations are 
formed by providing evidence that accounting information at an aggregate level could influence 




aggregate level relates to the macroeconomy by examining aggregate tone, a relatively unexplored 
















Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
This table reports sample descriptive statistics.  The sample is from 1994-2012.  All data are monthly and 
variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Unscaled values of CONS, GDP, and LABOR are presented for 
ease of interpretation.   
       
Variable Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 N 
ICS 87.78 13.79 76.40 90.60 96.50 227 
ICS_CURRENT 98.73 14.50 88.10 103.60 109.20 227 
ICS_EXPECTED 80.73 14.04 69.60 81.60 90.10 227 
CBICS 94.68 28.46 71.54 98.40 111.94 227 
CBICS_CURRENT 104.37 49.36 64.21 110.37 138.47 227 
CBICS_EXPECTED 88.22 17.93 78.36 91.52 99.59 227 
BW 0.15 0.57 -0.14 0.02 0.27 203 
       
TONE_TOTAL 0.92 0.36 0.63 0.99 1.20 227 
TONE_TONAL 35.84 12.99 26.65 40.69 45.98 227 
FILINGCT 667.06 624.02 211.00 367.00 1144.00 227 
EARNSURP -0.02 0.68 -0.28 0.04 0.33 227 
       
CAY -0.13 2.06 -1.71 -0.66 1.31 227 
CONS 10.18 0.21 9.99 10.20 10.38 227 
CPI 0.20 0.36 0.00 0.20 0.40 227 
DEF 0.98 0.46 0.69 0.87 1.13 227 
GDP 10.71 0.09 10.66 10.74 10.78 227 
LABOR 5.90 0.03 5.87 5.91 5.93 227 
URATE 5.93 1.72 4.70 5.50 6.10 227 




Table 2 – Correlation matrix 
This table reports Pearson correlations for the sample.  All data are monthly and variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Variables CONS, GDP, and 
LABOR are unscaled. Correlations significant at least at the 10% level are in bold. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
[1] ICS 1.00
[2] CBICS 0.94 1.00 
[3] BW 0.22 0.38 1.00 
[4] TONE_TOTAL -0.26 -0.24 -0.23 1.00 
[5] TONE_TONAL -0.20 -0.17 -0.23 0.96 1.00 
[6] FILINGCT -0.23 -0.17 0.01 0.07 0.16 1.00 
[7] EARNSURP 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 1.00 
[8] CAY 0.60 0.58 0.23 -0.45 -0.39 -0.31 0.03 1.00 
[9] CONS -0.69 -0.61 -0.12 0.41 0.34 0.35 -0.02 -0.94 1.00 
[10] CPI 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 1.00 
[11] DEF -0.67 -0.65 -0.19 0.34 0.29 0.17 -0.30 -0.49 0.52 -0.24 1.00 
[12] GDP -0.53 -0.43 -0.05 0.46 0.40 0.34 -0.03 -0.91 0.97 -0.01 0.44 1.00 
[13] LABOR 0.50 0.53 0.21 0.35 0.36 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 -0.09 0.05 -0.11 0.14 1.00 
[14] URATE -0.74 -0.85 -0.38 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.05 -0.57 0.50 -0.09 0.45 0.30 -0.66 1.00 
[15] YLD3 0.69 0.81 0.42 -0.26 -0.20 -0.19 -0.01 0.75 -0.67 0.08 -0.56 -0.57 0.24 -0.80 1.00 
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Table 3 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment 
Panel A – ICS sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment at times t, t+1, and t+2 
on the lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures and control variables.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard 
errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  Variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable ICSt ICSt+1 ICSt+2 ICSt ICSt+1 ICSt+2 
       
TONE_TOTALt-1 -6.6331*** -6.7785*** -7.9664***    
 [2.079] [2.207] [2.257]    
TONE_TONALt-1    -0.1779*** -0.1785*** -0.2031*** 
    [0.054] [0.061] [0.064] 
FILINGCTt-1 0.0004 0.0009** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0008** 0.0003 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
EARNSURPt-1 0.5003 0.2880 -0.8404* 0.2636 0.0458 -1.1259** 
 [0.420] [0.401] [0.429] [0.430] [0.419] [0.464] 
CAYt-1 -6.0743*** -5.3436*** -4.4802*** -6.1289*** -5.3970*** -4.5381*** 
 [1.038] [1.030] [1.056] [1.022] [1.022] [1.049] 
CONSt-1 -2.6081*** -3.0218*** -3.1456*** -2.6580*** -3.0712*** -3.2002*** 
 [0.374] [0.361] [0.364] [0.376] [0.362] [0.364] 
CPIt-1 -3.0385** -0.9265 -0.3312 -3.2707** -1.1705 -0.6315 
 [1.500] [1.485] [1.508] [1.449] [1.444] [1.478] 
DEF t-1 -3.0449** -1.2918 -1.3974 -3.2917*** -1.5653 -1.7612 
 [1.297] [1.120] [1.257] [1.245] [1.079] [1.209] 
GDP t-1 4.4739*** 5.5094*** 5.9189*** 4.5737*** 5.6067*** 6.0239*** 
 [0.925] [0.882] [0.876] [0.932] [0.889] [0.882] 
LABOR t-1 -0.9685** -1.1796** -1.1810** -1.0234** -1.2426** -1.2690** 
 [0.476] [0.525] [0.537] [0.482] [0.532] [0.543] 
URATE t-1 -0.2011 1.1644 1.7993 -0.1416 1.2094 1.8205 
 [1.815] [1.971] [1.878] [1.783] [1.950] [1.872] 
YLD3 t-1 0.9791 1.1135 0.6763 1.0094 1.1366 0.6875 
 [0.728] [0.798] [0.834] [0.716] [0.793] [0.834] 
       
N  227  227 227 227 227 227 
R-squared  0.88  0.86 0.85          0.88            0.86            0.85 




Table 3 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment 
Panel B – CBICS sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence at times t, t+1, and t+2 on 
the lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures and control variables.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, 
which are presented underneath coefficient values.  Variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable CBICSt CBICSt+1 CBICSt+2 CBICSt CBICSt+1 CBICSt+2 
       
TONE_TOTALt-1 -13.5705*** -15.1891*** -15.0301***    
 [2.983] [3.040] [3.453]    
TONE_TONALt-1    -0.3560*** -0.4019*** -0.3859*** 
    [0.080] [0.084] [0.099] 
FILINGCTt-1 0.0021** 0.0011 0.0011 0.0019** 0.0009 0.0008 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
EARNSURPt-1 0.0714 -0.5178 -2.6386*** -0.4137 -1.0603 -3.1769*** 
 [0.898] [0.831] [0.886] [0.935] [0.883] [0.951] 
CAYt-1 -9.0568*** -9.1873*** -8.5878*** -9.1627*** -9.3084*** -8.6990*** 
 [1.703] [1.781] [1.971] [1.705] [1.786] [1.987] 
CONSt-1 -4.7202*** -5.6165*** -5.9984*** -4.8183*** -5.7281*** -6.1028*** 
 [0.609] [0.597] [0.634] [0.623] [0.614] [0.649] 
CPIt-1 -2.2718 1.9467 3.2513 -2.7632 1.4036 2.6901 
 [2.201] [2.232] [2.491] [2.142] [2.166] [2.422] 
DEF t-1 -5.0389** -2.4920 -3.1763 -5.5952** -3.0928 -3.8453* 
 [2.392] [2.175] [2.328] [2.349] [2.156] [2.294] 
GDP t-1 9.1505*** 11.1515*** 12.0329*** 9.3433*** 11.3721*** 12.2348*** 
 [1.524] [1.505] [1.591] [1.558] [1.548] [1.631] 
LABOR t-1 -2.3462*** -2.9349*** -3.1842*** -2.4753*** -3.0722*** -3.3445*** 
 [0.809] [0.890] [0.982] [0.829] [0.906] [1.005] 
URATE t-1 -1.9167 0.2683 1.4177 -1.8333 0.3780 1.4707 
 [2.647] [2.906] [3.128] [2.596] [2.864] [3.131] 
YLD3 t-1 5.0009*** 5.2772*** 4.7212*** 5.0438*** 5.3334*** 4.7489*** 
 [1.165] [1.181] [1.301] [1.157] [1.172] [1.308] 
       
N 227 227 227 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.90 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 3 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment 
Panel C – BW sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index at times t, t+1, and t+2 on the 
lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures and control variables.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, 
which are presented underneath coefficient values.  Variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable BWt BWt+1 BWt+2 BWt BWt+1 BWt+2 
       
TONE_TOTALt-1 -0.6612*** -0.7157*** -0.6881***    
 [0.220] [0.221] [0.235]    
TONE_TONALt-1    -0.0174*** -0.0182*** -0.0173*** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
FILINGCTt-1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
EARNSURPt-1 -0.1867*** -0.1344** -0.0895* -0.2109*** -0.1597*** -0.1135** 
 [0.066] [0.058] [0.050] [0.068] [0.060] [0.051] 
CAYt-1 0.3732*** 0.3378** 0.2913* 0.3642*** 0.3273** 0.2809* 
 [0.140] [0.146] [0.153] [0.137] [0.143] [0.150] 
CONSt-1 0.0128 -0.0015 -0.0198 0.0074 -0.0076 -0.0260 
 [0.041] [0.038] [0.036] [0.041] [0.038] [0.036] 
CPIt-1 0.0476 0.0435 0.0768 0.0192 0.0134 0.0476 
 [0.098] [0.099] [0.099] [0.097] [0.100] [0.099] 
DEF t-1 -0.1433 -0.0762 0.0120 -0.1647 -0.0988 -0.0108 
 [0.150] [0.140] [0.133] [0.148] [0.136] [0.127] 
GDP t-1 0.0619 0.0901 0.1232 0.0721 0.1011 0.1342 
 [0.093] [0.089] [0.085] [0.093] [0.090] [0.088] 
LABOR t-1 0.1078 0.0966 0.0786 0.1013 0.0889 0.0709 
 [0.065] [0.062] [0.058] [0.063] [0.060] [0.057] 
URATE t-1 0.2986** 0.3120** 0.3148* 0.3014** 0.3138* 0.3172* 
 [0.142] [0.157] [0.166] [0.143] [0.160] [0.169] 
YLD3 t-1 0.1849*** 0.2053*** 0.2236*** 0.1881*** 0.2092** 0.2276*** 
 [0.070] [0.079] [0.080] [0.072] [0.081] [0.083] 
       
N 203 202 201 203 202 201 
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment conditional on tone dispersion 
Panel A – ICS sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment at times t, t+1, and t+2 
on the lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures during periods of high and low tone dispersion and control variables.  
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHDISP (TONE_TONAL_HIGHDISP) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the month’s standard deviation 
of within-month firm-level filing tone is in the top tercile of the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  
TONE_TOTAL_LOWDISP (TONE_TONAL_LOWDISP) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the month’s standard deviation of 
within-month firm-level filing tone is in the bottom two terciles of the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  
Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are 
as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable ICSt ICSt+1 ICSt+2 ICSt ICSt+1 ICSt+2 
       
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHDISPt-1 -2.7085 -1.6410 -2.3044    
 [1.803] [1.791] [1.806]    
TONE_TOTAL_LOWDISPt-1 -6.6327*** -6.7780*** -7.9659***    
 [1.950]††† [2.002]††† [2.027]†††    
TONE_TONAL_HIGHDISPt-1    -0.0942** -0.0541 -0.0636 
    [0.045] [0.047] [0.050] 
TONE_TONAL_LOWDISPt-1    -0.1805*** -0.1823*** -0.2074*** 
    [0.051]††† [0.053]††† [0.056]††† 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 227 227 227 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.86 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment conditional on tone dispersion 
Panel B – CBICS sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence at times t, t+1, and t+2 on the 
lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures during periods of high and low tone dispersion and control variables.  TONE_TOTAL_HIGHDISP 
(TONE_TONAL_HIGHDISP) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the month’s standard deviation of within-month firm-level filing 
tone is in the top tercile of the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  TONE_TOTAL_LOWDISP 
(TONE_TONAL_LOWDISP) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the month’s standard deviation of within-month firm-level filing tone 
is in the bottom two terciles of the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  Statistical significance is assessed using 
Newey-West standard errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
       
 (1) (3) (5) (2) (4) (6) 
Dependent Variable CBICSt CBICSt+1 CBICSt+2 CBICSt CBICSt+1 CBICSt+2 
       
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHDISPt-1 -4.7833 -6.3263** -5.1214*    
 [3.333] [2.752] [3.007]    
TONE_TOTAL_LOWDISPt-1 -13.5697*** -15.1883*** -15.0291***    
 [2.716]††† [2.724]††† [3.095]†††    
TONE_TONAL_HIGHDISPt-1    -0.1711* -0.2030*** -0.1607* 
    [0.090] [0.072] [0.083] 
TONE_TONAL_LOWDISPt-1    -0.3617*** -0.4080*** -0.3929*** 
    [0.072]††† [0.073]††† [0.087]††† 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 227 227 227 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 




Table 4 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment conditional on tone dispersion 
Panel C – BW sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index at times t, t+1, and t+2 on the lagged 
aggregate disclosure tone measures during periods of high and low tone dispersion and control variables.  TONE_TOTAL_HIGHDISP 
(TONE_TONAL_HIGHDISP) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the month’s standard deviation of within-month firm-level filing 
tone is in the top tercile of the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  TONE_TOTAL_LOWDISP 
(TONE_TONAL_LOWDISP) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the month’s standard deviation of within-month firm-level filing tone 
is in the bottom two terciles of the monthly standard deviations for the sample, and zero otherwise.  Statistical significance is assessed using 
Newey-West standard errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
       
 (1) (3) (5) (2) (4) (6) 
Dependent Variable BWt BWt+1 BWt+2 BWt BWt+1 BWt+2 
       
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHDISPt-1 -0.3122 -0.3188 -0.2614    
 [0.199] [0.195] [0.175]    
TONE_TOTAL_LOWDISPt-1 -0.7861*** -0.8570*** -0.8397***    
 [0.217]††† [0.215]††† [0.236]†††    
TONE_TONAL_HIGHDISPt-1    -0.0132** -0.0137** -0.0120** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
TONE_TONAL_LOWDISPt-1    -0.0203*** -0.0214*** -0.0210*** 
    [0.006]†† [0.006]††† [0.006]††† 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 203 202 201 203 202 201 
R-squared 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.42 




Table 5 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment conditional on filing intensity 
Panel A – ICS sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment at times t, t+1, and t+2 
on the lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures during periods of high and low filing intensity and control variables.  
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHFILING (TONE_TONAL_HIGHFILING) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the filing count for the month 
is above the median monthly filing count for the sample, and zero otherwise.  TONE_TOTAL_LOWFILING (TONE_TONAL_LOWFILING) 
equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the filing count for the month is below the median monthly filing count for the sample, and 
zero otherwise.  This analysis was performed for sample years 1996-2012.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard 
errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable ICSt ICSt+1 ICSt+2 ICSt ICSt+1 ICSt+2 
       
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHFILINGt-1 -7.6741*** -7.5064*** -8.1829***    
 [2.182] [2.387] [2.434]    
TONE_TOTAL_LOWFILINGt-1 -6.1877*** -6.3766*** -8.0996***    
 [2.005]†† [2.185]† [2.286]    
TONE_TONAL_HIGHFILINGt-1    -0.2225*** -0.2138*** -0.2269*** 
    [0.058] [0.067] [0.071] 
TONE_TONAL_LOWFILINGt-1    -0.1759*** -0.1770*** -0.2162*** 
    [0.052]††† [0.061]†† [0.066] 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.86 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 5 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment conditional on filing intensity 
Panel B – CBICS sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence at times t, t+1, and t+2 on the 
lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures during periods of high and low filing intensity and control variables.  
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHFILING (TONE_TONAL_HIGHFILING) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the filing count for the month 
is above the median monthly filing count for the sample, and zero otherwise.  TONE_TOTAL_LOWFILING (TONE_TONAL_LOWFILING) 
equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the filing count for the month is below the median monthly filing count for the sample, and 
zero otherwise.  This analysis was performed for sample years 1996-2012.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard 
errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable CBICSt CBICSt+1 CBICSt+2 CBICSt CBICSt+1 CBICSt+2 
       
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHFILINGt-1 -14.6192*** -15.3580*** -15.8664***    
 [3.193] [3.272] [3.669]    
TONE_TOTAL_LOWFILINGt-1 -12.5927*** -14.5126*** -14.8108***    
 [2.774]† [3.053] [3.426]    
TONE_TONAL_HIGHFILINGt-1    -0.4209*** -0.4441*** -0.4394*** 
    [0.085] [0.090] [0.110] 
TONE_TONAL_LOWFILINGt-1    -0.3530*** -0.4080*** -0.3974*** 
    [0.073]†† [0.083] [0.101] 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 5 – Aggregate disclosure and sentiment conditional on filing intensity 
Panel C – BW sample 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index at times t, t+1, and t+2 on the lagged 
aggregate disclosure tone measures during periods of high and low filing intensity and control variables.  TONE_TOTAL_HIGHFILING 
(TONE_TONAL_HIGHFILING) equals TONE_TOTAL (TONE_TONAL) when the filing count for the month is above the median monthly 
filing count for the sample, and zero otherwise.  TONE_TOTAL_LOWFILING (TONE_TONAL_LOWFILING) equals TONE_TOTAL 
(TONE_TONAL) when the filing count for the month is below the median monthly filing count for the sample, and zero otherwise.  This 
analysis was performed for sample years 1996-2012.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, which are 
presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable BWt BWt+1 BWt+2 BWt BWt+1 BWt+2 
       
TONE_TOTAL_HIGHFILINGt-1 -0.6832*** -0.7650*** -0.7401***    
 [0.222] [0.221] [0.238]    
TONE_TOTAL_LOWFILINGt-1 -0.7108*** -0.7748*** -0.7486***    
 [0.223] [0.222] [0.234]    
TONE_TONAL_HIGHFILINGt-1    -0.0209*** -0.0226*** -0.0218*** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
TONE_TONAL_LOWFILINGt-1    -0.0206*** -0.0219*** -0.0211*** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 180 179 178 180 179 178 
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.43 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6 – Aggregate disclosure and current and expected components of consumer indices 
Panel A – ICS sample 
     
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the current and expected components of the 
University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment on the lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures and 
control variables.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, which are 
presented underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable ICS_CURRENTt ICS_EXPECTEDt ICS_CURRENTt ICS_EXPECTEDt 
     
TONE_TOTALt-1 -4.0222* -8.2831***   
 [2.190] [2.410]   
TONE_TONALt-1   -0.1172** -0.2165*** 
   [0.057] [0.062] 
FILINGCTt-1 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0006 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
EARNSURPt-1 0.9999** 0.1768 0.8575* -0.1194 
 [0.473] [0.520] [0.489] [0.515] 
CAYt-1 -4.7775*** -6.9207*** -4.8174*** -6.9848*** 
 [0.960] [1.341] [0.945] [1.330] 
CONSt-1 -1.9072*** -3.0563*** -1.9422*** -3.1158*** 
 [0.352] [0.451] [0.354] [0.454] 
CPIt-1 -2.0869 -3.6381** -2.2088 -3.9396** 
 [1.544] [1.610] [1.499] [1.559] 
DEF t-1 -7.6863*** -0.0537 -7.7769*** -0.3980 
 [1.545] [1.408] [1.520] [1.343] 
GDP t-1 3.2338*** 5.2629*** 3.3074*** 5.3796*** 
 [0.821] [1.138] [0.822] [1.152] 
LABOR t-1 -0.7393 -1.1143* -0.7532 -1.1947** 
 [0.460] [0.579] [0.461] [0.582] 
URATE t-1 -1.7421 0.7755 -1.6619 0.8229 
 [1.801] [1.967] [1.783] [1.934] 
YLD3 t-1 1.0545 0.9285 1.0950 0.9529 
 [0.779] [0.808] [0.771] [0.801] 
     
N 227 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.89 0.82 0.89 0.82 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6 – Aggregate disclosure and current and expected components of consumer indices 
Panel B – CBICS sample 
     
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of the current and expected components of the 
Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence on the lagged aggregate disclosure tone measures and 
control variables.  Statistical significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, which are presented 
underneath coefficient values.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable 
CBICS_CURRENTt CBICS_EXPECTEDt CBICS_CURRENTt CBICS_EXPECTEDt 
     
TONE_TOTALt-1 -22.0705*** -7.9038**   
 [3.511] [3.419]   
TONE_TONALt-1   -0.5746*** -0.2102** 
   [0.093] [0.089] 
FILINGCTt-1 0.0022* 0.0020** 0.0019 0.0019** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
EARNSURPt-1 -2.5767* 1.8369* -3.3662** 1.5547 
 [1.361] [0.977] [1.402] [1.005] 
CAYt-1 -8.6833*** -9.3058*** -8.8524*** -9.3695*** 
 [2.460] [1.966] [2.559] [1.936] 
CONSt-1 -6.6451*** -3.4370*** -6.8024*** -3.4956*** 
 [0.859] [0.679] [0.893] [0.681] 
CPIt-1 1.5972 -4.8511** 0.7892 -5.1314** 
 [2.766] [2.337] [2.658] [2.306] 
DEF t-1 1.2296 -9.2179*** 0.2973 -9.5235*** 
 [3.977] [2.390] [3.960] [2.340] 
GDP t-1 14.2293*** 5.7646*** 14.5368*** 5.8809*** 
 [2.044] [1.611] [2.117] [1.623] 
LABOR t-1 -4.0386*** -1.2179 -4.2575*** -1.2871 
 [1.120] [0.919] [1.147] [0.926] 
URATE t-1 -6.5669** 1.1834 -6.4517** 1.2457 
 [2.584] [3.141] [2.502] [3.119] 
YLD3 t-1 11.1289*** 0.9156 11.1883*** 0.9474 
 [1.398] [1.362] [1.394] [1.359] 
     
N 227 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.93 0.74 0.93 0.75 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 7 – Aggregate disclosure and fundamental and non-fundamental components of consumer 
indices 
This table presents the coefficients from an OLS regression of the fundamental and non-fundamental 
components of the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment and the Conference Board Index 
of Consumer Confidence on the aggregate tone measures and the aggregate earnings surprise.  The 
decomposition of the consumer indices into their fundamental and non-fundamental components is 
performed following the methodology found in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006).  Statistical significance 
is assessed using Newey-West standard errors, which are presented underneath coefficient values.  All other 
variables are as defined in Appendix A.   
 
Independent Variable TONE_TOTALt-1 TONE_TONALt-1 
   
UM_NONFUNDAMENTALt -2.7488** -0.0892** 
 [1.359] [0.038] 
CB_NONFUNDAMENTALt -5.1479** -0.1635*** 
 [2.171] [0.059] 
UM_FUNDAMENTALt -8.2943 -0.1502 
 [5.218] [0.145] 
CB_FUNDAMENTALt -15.8287 -0.280 
 [10.937] [0.302] 
   
N 227 227 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   

















Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
This appendix provides the variable definitions.  All data are monthly.   
  
Variable Definition 
ICS University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment 
ICS_CURRENT Current component of the University of Michigan Index of Consumer 
Sentiment 
ICS_EXPECTED Expected component of the University of Michigan Index of Consumer 
Sentiment 
CBICS Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence 
CBICS_CURRENT Current component of the Conference Board Index of Consumer 
Confidence 
CBICS_EXPECTED Expected component of the Conference Board Index of Consumer 
Confidence 
BW Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index 
  
TONE_TOTAL Value-weighted average of the firm-level percentage of negative words less 
positive words in 10-Q and 10-K filings (base is total words) 
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TONE_TONAL Value-weighted average of the firm-level percentage of negative words less 
positive words in 10-Q and 10-K filings (base is total positive and negative 
words) 
FILINGCT Number of 10-Q and 10-K filings 
EARNSURP Value-weighted average of firm-level standardized unexpected earnings 
(SUE) based on a seasonal random-walk model 
  
CAY Log consumption-to-wealth ratio from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), 
multiplied by 100 
CONS Natural log of personal consumption expenditures per capita, multiplied by 
100 
CPI Inflation rate 
DEF Default spread, measured as the difference between yields to maturity on 
Moody’s Baa- and Aaa-rated bonds 
GDP Natural log of chained (2009 dollars) gross domestic product per capita, 
multiplied by 100 
LABOR Natural log of labor income, measured as real disposable personal income 
per capita, deflated by the PCE deflator, multiplied by 100 
URATE Unemployment rate 






Appendix B: Consumer sentiment indices 
 
 The University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment is conducted by the University 
of Michigan Survey Research Center.  It was initiated in 1947 on a quarterly basis and moved to a 
monthly basis in 1978.   
The survey is sent to approximately 500 households in the United States and the 
respondents are asked the following questions: (1) We are interested in how people are getting 
along financially these days.  Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off 
or worse off financially than you were a year ago?  (2) Now looking ahead—do you think that a 
year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or 
just about the same as now?”  (3) Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole – 
do you think that during the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad times, 
or what?”  (4) Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole 
we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of 
widespread unemployment or depression, or what?”  (5) About the big things people buy for their 
homes—such as furniture, a refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that.  Generally 
speaking, do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?”   
 A relative score is calculated for each question as the percent of favorable replies less the 
percent of unfavorable replies, plus 100, rounded to the nearest whole number.  The scores for 
questions (1) and (5) comprise the current component of the index, questions (2) – (4) comprise 




A representative of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center states that the 
normal interview pattern begins shortly before the final release of the previous month and 
continues through the beginning of the week before the final data release.  The final release dates 
are towards the end of the month.  Thus, the index calculated for the month of October is related 
to interviews held at the very end of September and throughout the month of October.   
 The Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence is conducted by the Conference 
Board and was initiated in 1967, turning into a monthly poll in 1977.  The survey is sent to 
approximately 5,000 households in the United States and although the questions are similar to 
those of the University of Michigan survey, they are as follows: (1) How would you rate present 
general business conditions in your area?  (2) What would you say about available jobs in your 
area right now?  (3) Six months from now, do you think business conditions in your area will be 
better, the same, or worse?  (4) Six months from now, do you think there will be more, the same, 
or fewer jobs available in your area?  (5) Would you guess your total family income to be higher, 
the same, or lower six months from now? 
 A relative score is calculated for each question as the percent of favorable replies divided 
by the sum of favorable and unfavorable replies.  The scores for questions (1) and (2) comprise 
the current component of the index, with the remaining questions comprising the expected 
component, and the final index is comprised of all five questions.  The final results for a month 
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